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CORRELATION OF PRIORITY AND LIEN RIGHTS
IN THE COLLECTION OF FEDERAL TAXES
By LEONARD SARNER t
The extent to which priorities exist between the Federal Gov-
ernment's claim or lien for taxes and claims or liens imposed under
state law is a matter of far-reaching importance in the administration
of the revenue laws. Taxes must be collected and collected promptly.
It is not enough that the Federal Government has the power and facil-
ity to seek out just about all the property owned by the taxpayer and
summarily subject it to the payment of his proportionate share of com-
munity expenses.1 For the collection, problem seems to become acute
only when the taxpayer does not have sufficient funds at the time the
taxes are due to meet all his obligations. At this point other creditors
are apt to rush to enforce their claims. In the ensuing scramble the
tax collector often finds himself competing with states and municipali-
ties as well as with private creditors. In such a contest the question
of who emerges victor revives in some ways the early and critical con-
troversies between those who sought to maintain the supremacy of thej
National Government and those who were anxious to sustain undimin-
ished power of the states.
2
The champions' of federal supremacy saw to it that the collector
was not left altogether destitute. His first string is reliance on the pri-
ority demanded by Section 3466, Revised Statutes. 3 Section 3466 is
merely a priority statute,4 but it demands that the debts of the United
States be satisfied first whenever the taxpayer is insolvent and the in-
solvency has been shown by one of the ways specified, as, for example,
attachment, assignment, or other act of bankruptcy. Taxes are debts
within the meaning of the section and are subject to its protection.5
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i. See INT. REv. CODE § 369o et seq., 53 STAT. 451 (1939), 26 U. S. C. § 369o
(1940).
2. County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U. S. 80 (1929).
3. Rmv. STAT. § 3466 (1878), 31 U. S. C. § 1gI (I94O), provides: "Whenever any
person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever the estate of any deceased
debtor, in the hands of the executors or administrators, is insufficient to pay all the
debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the United States shall be first satis-
fied; and the priority established shall extend as well to cases in which a debtor, not
having sufficient property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof,
or in which the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are
attached by process of law, as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed."
4. Section 3466, does not create a lien. Bramwell v. U. S. Fidelity Co., 269 U. S.
483, 488 (1926).
5. Price v. United States, 269 U. S. 492 (1926). The United States has no sover-
eign common law priority. United States v. State Bank of North Carolina, 6 Pet. 29
(739)
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On its face the language of the section admits of no qualifications, but
it was both intimated and held in some early cases that since a mortgage
and certain other liens could divest title or possession from the debtor,
the interests so divested not being in the debtor were not subject to the
Government's priority rights.6 The priority of the United States
arises at the time of the definitive act of insolvency.7 , Hence, any
claims which a state or private creditor may have at that time will be
subordinated to the claim of the United States unless the creditor has
a mortgage, a possessory lien, or perhaps a specific perfected non-
possessory lien.
Recent contests relating to the application of Section 3466 have
been concerned with this last type of lien, the thought being that a
specific perfected non-possessory lien rather than an inchoate floating
general type of lien could override the priority demanded by Section
3466.8 Inchoate liens are common creatures of statea.w. In many
ways they are similar to non-lien priority provisions. They are
inchoate for the reason that at any point of time something remains
to be done to make them specific and perfected. The amount of the
lien 9 or the identity of the lienor 10 may not have been definitely set-
tled; steps necessary to enforce the lien may not as yet have been
taken;"1 or no particular property may have been segregated from the
gross assets of the debtor to which the lien attaches.1 2 If at the time
the United States acquires its priority rights under Section 3466 the
competing lien is characterized by any one of the above factors the claim
of the lienor must fall.
Reliance on Section 3466, however, has definite limitations. Sec-
tion 3466 speaks of debts due from the insolvent. By definition, the
(U. S. 1832). The circuit court in Price v. United States, supra, had held that the
sovereign prerogative extended to federal taxes, although not to other debts. Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 6 F. 2d 752 (C. C. A. 2d 1925). For a discussion of the
sovereign prerogative see Crane, A Royal Prerogative in the United States, 34 W. VA.
L. Q. 317 (1928).
6. Thelusson v. Smith, 2 Wheat. 396 (U. S. 1817) ; Conard v. Atlantic Insurance
Co., i Pet. 286 (U. S. 1828).
7. County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U. S. 8o, 93 (1929); Bramwell v.
U. S. Fidelity Co., 269 U. S. 483, 488 (1926) ; United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U. S.
253, 260 (1923).
8. See Illinois v. Campbell, 67 Sup. Ct. 340 (1946); United States v. Waddill,
Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U. S. 353 (1945) ; United States v. Texas, 314 U. S. 480,
485-486 (1941) ; New York v. Maclay, 288 U. S. 290, 294 (1933).
9. United States v. Texas, supra note 8 (amount of state gasoline taxes unsettled).
io. United States v. Knott, 298 U. S. 544 (1936) (Trust fund for unknown cred-
itors).
ii. United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U. S. 353 (1945) (land-
lord's lien for distress).
12. Thelusson v. Smith, 2 Wheat. 396 (U. S. 1817) (general judgment on land);
Illinois v. Campbell, 67 Sup. Ct. 340 (946) ; United States v. Waddill, Holland &
Flinn, Inc., mtpra note ii (property subject to the lien not specified).
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claim of the United States, as well as the claims of the competing cred-
itors, to be due from the insolvent himself, must exist prior to the act
of insolvency. But debts and expenses may be incurred after the act
of insolvency. The Government has never claimed that Section 3466
supersedes expenses of administration 13 and certain charges 14 which
are not considered debts of the insolvent. Hence, the Government
must look elsewhere if it wishes to override these charges and debts
arising after the act of insolvency. Moreover, Section 3466 actually
does not give the Government ample protection against even prior
claims. Since the acts which call Section 3466 into play often justify
an involuntary petition in bankruptcy the Government will lose most
of its priority if bankruptcy results and it has to rely solely on Section
3466.15 For the Bankruptcy Act sets up its own priorities, and
Section 3466 does not apply generally to change the order of distribu-
tion, but merely gives the United States a fifth priority under Section
64 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act. 16  In general, lien claimants fall under
Section 67 of the Bankruptcy Act,loa and any lien under Section 67
takes precedence over any unsecured priority claim under Section 64
even though the claimant is the United States, with the possible subor-
dination exceptions of Section 67 (c). 1 7 Under state laws creating
various types of inchoate floating liens the state and other claimants
will have valid lien interests recognized in bankruptcy, since inchoate
general liens are specifically protected and validated by Section 67.1s
But Section 3466 does not create a lien, and thus an inchoate lien under
Section 67 is ahead of any claim for taxes without a lien under Section
64.' 9 In order to preserve the revenue in cases where the taxpayer is
bankrupt, the Government, therefore, must assert a lien which will
be entitled to priority under Section 67 of the Bankruptcy Act over
the inchoate general liens recognized by that section.
13. In Brief for United States, pp. 26-7, County of Spokane v. United States, 279
U. S. 8o (1929), the Government stated that § 3466 may be open to the construction
that the priority exists only over debts owing by the insolvent and not by the receiver.
14. An example is the widow's exemption in Pennsylvania. I. T. 2712, XII-2 CuM.
BULL. 138 (1933).
15. See Rogge, The Differences in the Priority of the United States in Bank-
ruptcy and it Equity Receivership, 43 HARV. L. REV. 251 (1929).
-16. 52 STAT. 874 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 104 (194o). Guarantee Title & Trust Co.
v. Title Guaranty Co., 224 U. S. 152 (1912) ; United States v. Sampsell, 153 F. 2d 731
(C. C. A. 9th 1946). Although § 3466 provides that the priority shall extend to cases
where an act of bankruptcy is committed, as soon as bankruptcy results, § 3466 is no
longer applicable to give the Government first priority.
i6a. 52 STAT. 875 (1938), 1, U. S. C. § 107 (,940).
x7. City of Richmond v. Bird, 249 U. S. 174 (1919) ; In re Knox-Powell-Stockton
Co., 1oo F.2d 979 (C. C. A. 9th 1939).
18. United States v. Sampsell, I53 F. 2d 73I (C. C. A. 9th 1946).
19. it re Knox-Powell-Stockton Co.. ioo F. 2d 979 (C. C. A. 9th 1939).
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The Government's rights as a lien claimant arise for the most part
from Section 386, Revised Statutes. 20  This section sets up a lien
for all types of taxes not otherwise specifically provided for, as, for
example, estate 21 and gift 22 taxes which carry their own special lien
provisions. The estate tax lien arises on death and is effective with-
out demand, assessment or recording.2 3  The Section 3186 lien arises
when the assessment list is received, provided that the demand for
taxes is made, and requires that a recording notice be filed before it is
effective as to certain enumerated classes. 24 Section 386 creates a
lien of sweeping application. It covers all property of the taxpayer,
after acquired 25 as well as property exempt under state law,2 6 and is
designed to prevent any decline in the asset position of the Government.
The estate and gift tax liens are restricted to certain property, and the
estate tax is expressly made subject to certain charges and expenses ac-
cruing after death.27  Except for this subordinate estate tax feature the
liens, once they attach, are vested with the same priorities and at-
tributes .2  None of the liens specify that the United States has a first
lien or shall be paid first, as does Section 3466. At one time this absence
of priority language led some courts to conclude that Congress had by its
silence sanctioned the individual states to accord the Federal lien what-
ever subordinate position they desired .29 , It is true that Congress knows
how to specify a first lien when it wants to,80 but it should be evident
2o. Now INT. REv. CODE § 3670 et seq. The general tax lien will be referred to
hereinafter as § 3186, and the estate tax lien (now INT. REV. CODE § 827) as § 315 (a)
of the Revenue Act of 1926. For a general discussion relating to the Federal tax lien
see Clark, Federal Tax Liens and their Enforcement, 33 VA. L. REv. z3 (i947);
Rogge, The Tax Lien of the United States, 13 A. B. A. J. 576 (1927); Kohlmeier,
Federal Tax Lie7,s under Revised Statutes, Section 3186, 13 TAx MAG. 191 (I935).
21. IlN. REV. CODE § 827.
22. INT. REV. CODE § 1009.
23. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U. S. 329 (I943).
24. INT. REV. CODE § 3721-2.
25. Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U. S. 265 (1945).
26. Shambaugh v. Scofield, 132 F. 2d 345 (C. C. A. 5th 1942) ; Staley v. Vaughn,
50 S. W. 2d 907 (Tex. 1932). Some courts pay lip service to the rule, but hold the
property exempt because it does not "belong" to the taxpayer. Jones v. Kemp, 144 F.
2d 478 (C. C. A. ioth x944) ; Bigley v. Jones, 64 F. Supp. 389 (W. D. Okla. 1946).
For much the same reason it has been held that § 3186 does not attach to a Michigan
estate by the entireties for income taxes owed by the husband (United States v.
Nathanson, 6o F. Supp. 193 (E. D. Mich. 1945) ) although the estate tax lien attaches
where the tenancy by the entireties forms part of the gross estate. Detroit Bank v.
United States, 317 U. S. 329 (1943).
27. INT. REV. CODE § 827.
28. Littleston National Bank v. Penn Tile Works Co., 352 Pa. 238, 42 A. 2d 6o6
(945).
29. In re Mt. Jessup Coal Co., 7 F. Supp. 603 (M. D. Pa. 1934) ; City of Winston
Salem v. Powell Paving Co., 7 F. Supp. 424 (M. D. N. C. 1934); In re Wyley Co.,
292 Fed. 900 (N. D. Ga. 1923) ; Berrymont Land Co. v. Davis Creek Co., iig W. Va.
186, 192 S. E. 577 (1937). This doctrine still has its repercussions. Board of Super-
visors of Louisiana State University v. Hart, 26 So. 2d 361 (La. 1946) ; United States
v. Sampsell, 153 F. 2d 731 (C. C. A. 9th 1946).
30. INT. REv. CODE § 28oo(e) provides that the tax on distilled spirits shall be a
first lien on the spirits distilled, etc.
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that a tax lien established by Congress is an exercise of its constitutional
power to lay and collect taxes. Once Congress has legislated, the states
can not by a subsequent exercise of their legislative or judicial power
displace the lien imposed under the supremacy clause of the Constitu-
tion, regardless of whether the words "first lien" are present or
absent.31
PRIOR CLAIMS AND LIENS
We now turn specifically to those claims which arise prior to the
time the rights of the United States attach, whether the United States
comes in as a priority creditor under Section 3466 or as a lien claimant
under Section 3 186 of the Revised Statutes and 315 (a) of the Revenue
Act of 1926.32 For purposes of Section 3466 it matters not whether the
debt to the competing creditor was incurred prior, to or after the time
when the debtor became indebted to the United States; the United
States will take priority so long as both claims exist at the time of the
definitive act of bankruptcy, and the competing creditor has not reduced
his claim to the form of a mortgage, a possessory lien, or a specific per-
fected non-possessory lien.33 This assumes also that the debtor is not
thrown into bankruptcy. If that happens Section 3466 becomes virtu-
ally useless, since it affords the United States only a fifth priority under
Section 64, and falls behind any type of inchoate lien.
There is no provision in Section 3466 that the United States give
notice that the taxpayer who might in the future become insolvent is
indebted to the United States for taxes. On the other hand Section
3186 requires that the lien which it accords shall be recorded as to
certain enumerated classes. As it has been interpreted Section 3466
does not place the United States ahead of purchasers, mortgagees and
pledgees so that it might seem to be in accord with the policy which
led to the recording requirement of Section 3186. It has therefore been
held that Section 3186 was intended to modify the priority demanded
by Section 3466 to the extent that a judgment creditor of a deceased
insolvent taxpayer was entitled to be paid out of land owned by the
taxpayer ahead of the United States claiming under Section 3466.34
31. Michigan v. United States, 317 U. S. 338 (1943); United States v. City of
Greenville, i18 F. 2d 963 (C. C. A. 4th 1941).
32. § 315(a) of the Revenue Act of 1926 created a lien for estate taxes. See note
2o supra. It will hereinafter be referred to simply as Section 315(a).
33. Cases cited notes 8-12 smpra, and note 36 infra.
34. In Meyer's Estate, 159 Pa. Super. 296, 48 A. 2d 210 (1946) the Pennsylvania
Superior Court concluded that § 3466 must be construed as amended by the recording
provisions of § 3186, and that it was the intention of Congress to modify the rule in
Thelusson v. Smith, 2 Wheat. 396 (U. S. 1817), and place a judgment creditor in the
same position as a purchaser or mortgagee, thus giving a validity and status to judg-
ment lien creditors not previously possessed.
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However, the recording requirement of Section 3 186 was designed
primarily to protect subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers who
purchase or lend money on the strength of the record. 35 A claim under
Section 3466 can not be recorded, and by its terms it overrides earlier
as well as later claims of equal rank without concern for reliance. 30
Since the effect of holding that Section 3186 has modified Section 3466
is merely to add judgment creditors to the list of those already protected
under Section 3466 it is not shocking with regard to land where a
general judgment is usually a lien upon land from the time of recording.
However, it remains to be seen whether the reasoning will be extended
to cases where the subject of the contest is personal property upon
which a judgment is not usually a lien until the writ of execution is
delivered into the hands of the sheriff.
3 7
Section 3466 requires a concurrence of insolvency and the commis-
sion of a definitive act. Hence, if the taxpayer performs the act, e. 9.,
he goes into receivership, without being insolvent, Section 3466 will not
apply at that time.38 But if at any time thereafter the taxpayer does
become insolvent, Section 3466 will become effective. 39 The claims
which it will override, however, are still only those which exist prior
to the receivership. This assumes, of course, that the United States
priority claim for taxes exists at that time also.
There is no question that ordinarily all unsecured claims fall before
the liens specified in Sections 3186 and 315 (a). No affirmative
language is necessary to give the liens priority over earlier unsecured
claims. 40  A possible exception is the subordination to wage claims to
which Section 3T86 is subject in bankruptcy when payment is sought
from personal property.41 An ordinary claim arising before but reduced
to judgment after death is still only a claim and not a charge against a
decendent's estate, and is not entitled to payment ahead of a lien con-
ferred by Section 315 (a).
42
35. The classes protected are purchasers, mortgagees, pledgees and judgment cred-
itors. See SE. REP. No. 1315, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 1-2 (1912).
36. The court in Meyer's Estate, 159 Pa. Super. 296, 48 A. 2d 210 (946), seemed
impressed with the fact that the claim of the United States was for income taxes which
had accrued after the judgment was entered of record. Heretofore the time when the
respective claims arose was deemed unimportant for purposes of § 3466 priority. For
example, in United States v. WaddilL Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U. S. 353 (1945)
some of the personal property taxes included in the claim of the City of Danville ac-
crued in 1939 while none of the claims of the United States arose until 194o (Brief
for United States, p. 3, United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc.).
37. Claude D. Reese, Inc. v. United States, 75 F. 2d 9 (C. C. A. 5th 1935) ; Wil-
liams Patent Crusher Co. v. Reily, 118 Pa. Super. 64, i8o Ati. 156 (935).
38. United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U. S, 253 (1923).
39. Hatch v. Morosco Holding Co., 6I F. 2d 944 (C. C. A. 2d 1932).
40. See Peppin, Priority of Tax and Special Assessment Lieis, 23 CALIF. L. REv.
264 (1935).
41. § 67(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 STAT. 875 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 107 (1940).
42. United States v. McGuire, 42 F. Supp. 337 (D. C. D. N. J. 1941).
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The fact that under Section 3186 there is an inter-play between the
time the assessment list is received and the demand for taxes is made
has caused some comment to the effect that the provisions may be
ambiguous.43 An examination of the earlier statutes from which the
present Section 386 is derived removes most of the ambiguity. The
lien attaches only to property owned by the taxpayer 44 at the time of
the demand; that is, no lien exists until demand in the limited sense
that if the property is disposed of prior to demand the lien will not
attach.45 -But if the property is still owned by the taxpayer when the
demand is made; the lien's priority will date as of the time the assess-
ment list was received.
4 6
In view of the recording provisions of Section 386 and the ten
day time limit within which the collector is to make demand after he
receives the assessment list,47 the exact time the lien arises may seem
to be of academic and historical interest. However, certain classes of
secured creditors are not protected by the recording provisions. A
repairman's common law lien, for example, may arise after the assess-
ment list is received but before demand. The Curry 48 and Snyder 
49
cases which occasioned the recording amendment to Section 386 in-
volved the factual situation in which the receipt of the assessment list
and demand both took place prior to the time the innocent grantees
purchased the land. The grantees were treated as subsequent pur-
chasers who had to fall before Section 386. Although our repairman's
lien arose before demand, it can not be classified as a prior lien entitled
to priority in payment over Section 386. The Federal Government
43. MacKenzie v. United States, IO9 F. 2d 540 (C. C. A. 9th 1940). The state-
ment no doubt was prompted by the observation in the Government's brief that since
demand is not made until after the assessment list is received, the two provisions may
appear to be inconsistent (Brief for United States, p. 7, MacKenzie v. United States,
supra). Although the demand for taxes is to be made only after the assessment list is
received, it has been held that where demand for taxes was made but there was no
showing the collector actually had received the assessment list, the United States ac-
quired no lien. Kennebec Box Co. v. 0. S. Richards Corp., 5 F. 2d 951 (C. C. A. 2d
1925). For a more realistic approach, see United States v. Ettelson, 59 F. 2d 193 (C.
C. A. 7th 1947).
44. The provision for a federal tax lien was originally enacted in § 9 of the Act of
July 13, 1866, 14 STAT. 98, 107 (1866). That section read in part: "And if any person
* * * liable to pay any tax, shall neglect or refuse to pay the same after demand, the
amount shall be a lien in favor of the United States from the time is was due until
paid * * * upon all property and rights to property belonging to such person * *
(Italics 'supplied).
45. United States v. The Pacific R. R., i Fed. 97 (C. C. E. D. Mo. i88o). The
Government suggested in Brief for United States, pp. 26-7, Glass City Bank v. United
States, 326 U. S. 265 (945), that this case might be wrong as contra to United States
v. Snyder, 149 U. S. 210 (1893). However, in United States v. Snyder, supra, the
property was not disposed of until after demand.
46. Citizens State Bank v. Vidal, 114 F. 2d 380 (C. C. A. ioth 194o) ; Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 107 F. 2d 311 (C. C. A. 6th 1939).
47. IxT. REv. CODE § 3655.
48. United States v. Curry, 2oi Fed. 371 (D. C. D. Md. 1912).
49. United States v. Snyder, 149 U. S. 210 (1893).
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can give its lien whatever priority it chooses.5° In this case it has
expressly provided that the lien attaches at the time of receipt of the
assessment list. Under normal rules of lien priority relating to "first
in time, first in right" the United States woufd win.5f
Suppose, however, that the prior lien actually does arise before the
assessment list is received. The Government has not been concerned
about the role played by prior liens with respect to the federal lien for
taxes. Instead, it seems to have confined its energies to subordinating
the position of prior liens only in Section 3466 proceedings. Even
here, moreover, it has, as yet, made no concerted effort to override the
priority of mortgages or true possessory liens,52 although it has sug-
gested that the rationale of the old 6ases might be examined anew in
view of the changes in many states from the title to the lien theory of
mortgages. 53 The attack has been directed mainly against the propriety
of allowing a specific, perfected [non-possessory] lien to defeat the
priority demanded by Section 3466." In the main, the argument has
resolved itself into a factual step by step analysis which leads to the
conclusion that something short of payment always remains to be done
to enforce any type of lien.55 But on the assumption that a specific,
perfected lien can exist, the argument follows a well-defined, even stereo-
typed pattern.56 In insolvency proceedings some claimants are certain
to suffer. There is no reason why lien holders should be preferred
over the United States. Since the priority accorded claims of the
United States is for the purpose of securing revenue for the public
50. County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U. S. 8o (1929).
51. United States v. City of Greenville, 118 F. 2d 963 (C. C. A. 4th 1941).
52. In United States v. Texas, 314 U. S. 480 (1941), the Government did not seek
to disturb the rights of the prior mortgagee. In Brief for United States, p. 6, New
York v. Maclay, 288 U. S. 290 (1933), the Government observed that it was settled by
the decision of the Supreme Court that a mortgage defeats the priority of § 3466. See
also Brief for Respondent, p. 2o et seq., Illinois v. Campbell, 67 S. Ct. 340 (1946).
53. United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 33 F. 2d 533 (C. C. A. 8th 1929).
54. This reflects a gradual development of the Government's position. In 9 Oss.
Avr'y. GEN. 28, 29 (857), it was said: "By the later cases (Conard v. Atlantic Insur-
ance Co., I Pet. 386 (U. S. 1828) ; Brent v. Bank of Wash., io Pet 56 (U. S. 1837))
it seems to be well settled that the priority of the United States will not reach back
over any lien, whether it is general or specific." By the time of County of Spokane v.
United States, 279 U. S. 8o (1929), the Government would admit only that Conard v.
Atlantic Ins. Co., supra, and Brent v. Bank of Wash., supra, might perhaps give some
support for the contention, that a prior lien superseded § 3466 (Brief for United States,
p. x8, County of Spokane v. United States, supra). In United States v. Waddill, Hol-
land & Flinn, Inc., 323 U. S. 353 (1945) attaching creditors possessory liens and non-
possessory maritime liens were thought probably to be entitled to payment ahead of
§ 3466 (Brief for United States, pp. 10-12, County of Spokane v. United States, supra).
The two Illinois cases, Illinois v. United States, 328 U. S. 8 (1946) and Illinois v.
Campbell, 67 Sup. Ct. 340 (946), brought about the direct attack.
55. As the court observed in Meyer's Estate, 159 Pa. Super. 296, 48 A. 2d 21o
(1946), under this reasoning even a mortgage is not perfected, since it too must be fore-
closed to secure payment.
56. Brief for Respondent, p. 22, Illinois v. Campbell, 67 Sup. Ct. 340 (1946).
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benefit, the United States has a stronger argument for prior payment of
its claims against an insolvent estate than does a lien holder whose
interest is purely private. And even where a state holds the lien, its
interest, although of a public nature, is subordinate to the wider public
interest involved in a claim of the United States.
Instead of answering this policy argument, the Supreme Court has
continued to observe that it has never expressly determined the priority
to be given to specific perfected state liens under Section 3466.57, In
view of the language of the earlier Supreme Court cases, which inti-
mated that .the court had never held that a prior perfected lien did not
override Section 3466,5 the change in emphasis in the recent cases to
connote that there is doubt that such a lien does take priority over Sec-
tion 3466, must be taken with caution. The question may be academic,
though, since all the recent lien cases in the Supreme Court were held
to involve inchoate unperfected liens inferior to Section 3466.
The position of both the Government and the Supreme Court with
respect to the rank of the true possessory lien, e.g., a pledge, under Sec-
tion 3466 is not entirely clear. The Court has distinguished specifica-
tion and segregation of the exact property subject to the lien from actual
possession, and has intimated that the former would be sufficient, when
coupled with identity of the lienor and certainty of amount, to classify
the lien as specific and perfected.5 9 This suggests that specific per-
fected liens may be either possessory or non-possessory. Since the
cases in which the Court left open the rank of specific perfected liens
involved liens of a non-possessory type, the Court probably considers
the true possessory lien more in the category of a mortgage.60 The
policy argument of the Government, however, would apply to a posses-
sory lien as well as to a specific perfected non-possessory lien. For
that matter, it would apply equally well to a mortgage. Clearly the
Federal Government can displace prior private liens in collecting taxes
due it. No one has suggested that such an interpretation of Section
3466 would be unconstitutional, as taking A's property to pay the
tax of B. So long as ownership of the property remains in the tax-
payer, creditors take their chances on a sovereign prerogative. 61
57. Illinois v. Campbell, supra note 56; United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn,
Inc., 323 U. S. 353 (1945).
58. Conard v. Atlantic Insurance Co., i Pet. 386 (U. S. 1828) ; Brent v. Bank of
Wash., io Pet. 396 (U. S. 1837).
59. See cases cited note 57 supra.
6o. This also seems to be the position taken by the Government in United States
v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U. S. 353 (1945), where specific perfected
possessory liens were classified separately from specific perfected non-possessory mari-
time liens, or the liens acquired by attaching creditors. Brief for United States, pp.
lO-12, United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc.
61. See Peppin, supra note 40.
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But whatever its rank under Section 3466, the priority of the prior
lien,62 be it possessory or not, is well established under Section 3186,
so long as it is definite in amount and perfected in nature, and has
attached to specific property. 63  Even before the recording provisions of
Section 3186 the procedure under Section 3207, Revised Statutes,
64
gave some indication that there could be liens on property entitled to
payment ahead of those of the United States. Although Section 3207
did not set up the order in which encumbrances were to be paid, it
contemplated that prior lien claimants would be satisfied before the
United States.65 Since the 1913 amendment requiring recording as
against subsequent purchasers, judgment creditors, pledgees, and mort-
gagees, Section 3186 can not logically be held good as to prior lien
claimants who loaned their money when there was nothing in the record
to show that the United States was going to become a lien creditor for
taxes. A probable exception lies in prior liens which under state law
are invalid as to subsequent lien creditors because of failure to record.
A prior unrecorded mortgage would thus fall before Section 386; 66
but since its invalidity can be of avail only to subsequent lien creditors
or purchasers, it would continue to supplant the priority rights of the
United States under Section 3466.
62. Brief for United States, pp. 7-8, United States v. Texas, 314 U. S. 480 (I941),
contains the statement that whether the federal lien for taxes is superior to specific
liens held by other creditors generally depends upon which lien is first in time. A
prior mortgage is superior to §3186 (United States v. Sampsell 153 F. 2d 731 (C. C.
A. 9th 1946) ; Ormsbee v. United States, 23 F. 2d 926 (S. D. Fla. 1928)) although the
federal lien has been held to supplant an earlier perfected ship mortgage. The Melissa
Trask, 285 Fed. 781 (D. C. D. Mass. 1923) ; see also Fridlund, Fedral Taxes and Ship
Mortgages, 38 HARv. L. REv. io6o (1925).
63. In United States v. City of Greenville, 118 F. 2d 963 (C. C. A. 4th 1941) and
United States v. Reese, 131 F. 2d 466 (C. C. A. 7th 1942), the Government did not seek
to displace.the priority of prior state and municipal liens even though, under the posi-
tion taken by the Government, the federal lien under Section 3186 does not have to be
recorded to be valid against a state or municipality. See Brief for the United States,
p. 19, United States v. Sampsell, supra note 62. United States v. San Juan County, 280
Fed. 120 (W. D. Wash. 1922); Hopkins v. Eureka Coal Co., P-H FED. TAx SEgv.
1 162,496 (C. C. Kanawha Co., W. Va. 1944); State v. Wynne, 113 S. W. 2d 325
(Tex. Civ. App. i938), rev'd. on other grounds, 134 Tex. 455, 133 S. W. 2d 951 (1939)
support this position. On the other hand, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit has ruled that a state is a purchaser or judgment creditor protected by the
recording provisions of Section 3186. United States v. City of Detroit, 138 F. 2d 418
(i943), afirming 42-2 U. S. T. C. f 9702 (E. D. Mich. 1942). Although the question
was disposed of in a per curiam opinion, the point was specifically raised on brief.
Brief for the United States, p. 23.
64. Now INT. REv. CODE § 3678.
65. For a discussion of Section 32o7 and- the effect on it of the Act of 1931, 46
STAT. 1528, 28 U. S. C. § 9O1 (i94O), see Clark, supra note 2o; X-i Cum. BULL. 526
(931).
66. United States v. Underwood, ir8 F. 2d 76o (C. C. A. 5th 1941); Exchange
Nat. Bank of Tulsa v. Davy, 13 F. Supp. 226 (N. D. Okla. 1936). It has been held
that actual notice by a subsequent mortgagee of the unrecorded federal tax lien does
not give the Government priority.' United States v. Beaver Run Coal Co., 99 F. 2d
6io (C. C. A. 3d 1938) ; cf. United States v. Woodside, 4o-2 U. S. T. C. 9492 (W. D.
S. C. 1940).
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The estate tax lien requires no recording. It arises on death with-
out assessment, demand, or recording.67 Can it be said that it too falls
before prior liens? The answer is not completely free from doubt. In
Michigan v. United States,"" some of the property had been mortgaged
prior to the decedent's death. The Government conceded and the lower
court held that the mortgage was entitled to priority in payment over
the estate tax lien of Section 315 (a).69 Yet the Supreme Court went
out of its way to leave open the question of the priority of the specific
perfected lien to the same extent that it is unsettled, or settled, under
Section 3466. Probably for this reason the argument was advanced in
Decker's Estate 70 that a pledge falls before Section 315 (a). The
argument was rejected, apparently on the strength of the Government's
earlier concession in Michigan v. United States. Since pledged prop-
erty was involved in the Decker case, giving the lienor possession, the
situation technically does not fall within the sphere left open by reference
to the Section 3466 cases in Michigan v. United States.
A seemingly plausible argument can be advanced that prior liens
should give way to Section 315 (a). A prior lien against a decedent's
estate many times plays a double role. It not only is a lien on the prop-
erty but it may represent a claim which reduces the amount of the net
estate subject to tax. Section 315 (a) attaches to the gross estate. In
a sense the prior lien is not very different from ordinary claims which
under local law usually become liens on the decedent's estate. These
ordinary claims also reduce the amount of the tax for which the estate
tax lien is security. But they must be relegated to a secondary position,
if the provision attaching the estate tax to the gross estate is to have
much meaning. Property pledged or subject to a lien as security for a
debt on which the decedent was personally liable is still part of the gross
estate 71 and might, therefore, be said to fall behind Section 315 (a).
On the other side of the picture is the fact that once Section 315 (a)
attaches it is vested with just about the same priorities as Section 3186
except as to administration expenses and charges against the estate.
72
If Section 3186 falls before prior liens, Section 315 (a) probably does
also.
SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AND LIENs
The role of subsequent claims and liens is deceptively simple. Off-
hand it would seem obvious that claims or liens which arise after the
67. Detroit Bank v. United States, 37 U. S. 329 (1943).
68: 317 U. S. 338 (1943).
69. Brief for the United States, p. 6, Michigan v. United States.
70. 355 Pa. 331, 49 A. 2d 714 (1946).
71. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 1o5, § 81.38, relating to the treatment of unpaid mort-
gages for estate tax purposes.
72. Littleston Nat. Bank v. Penn Tile Works, 352 Pa. 238, 42 A. 2d 6o6 (945).
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rights of the United States for taxes are fixed must come in for pay-
ment behind the United States. With regard to Section 3466, if an
earlier claim is reduced to judgment after the definitive act of insolvency
Section 3466 is the victor. 3 The same is true for a creditor's claim
reduced to judgment after a decedent's death. Section 315 (a) is first
satisfied.74 And if an earlier claim is reduced to judgment -after Section
3186 is recorded, Section 3186 comes out ahead.75
The reason for this federal superiority is made eminently clear by
Michigan v. United States and United States v. City of Greenville.6
A state may provide that its lien for taxes or its lien used for the benefit
of its private citizens shall be a "first lien" in all cases whatsoever. If at
the time the rights of the United States attach, no state lien exists, but
thereafter a state lien is imposed entitled to first priority under state
law, this is only an attempt by the state to displace by a subsequent ex-
ercise of its taxing, legislative, or judicial power the priority or lien
of the United States established by Congress under its constitutional
authority to pay and collect taxes. Under the supremacy clause of
the constitution, the attempt must fail. Thus, as was the situation in
Michigan v. United States and United States-v. City of Greenville, if
real property is taxed by a state or municipality for years subsequent
to the time the lien of the-United States arises or, as was the situation
in Littlestown National Bank v. Penn Tile Works Co.,77 if an earlier
claim is reduced to a lien after the lien of the United States attaches, no
effort to make the state lien a "first lien entitled to be paid first" can
be successful. Nor is it material that the United States may be relying
on Section 3466 which does not create a lien. The important fact is
that a subsequent exercise of state power is brought into play to over-
ride the fixed rights of the United States, and this can not be done.
This statement in and of itself is easily understandable. Unfor-
tunately, however, the problem does not end here. Certain liens and
expenses which arise after the lien or priority rights of the United
States have attached do command priority in payment. Section 3466
speaks of debts due from the debtor. If, after the act specified in the
section occurs, e. g., the creation of an equity receivership, debts arise,
these are not debts of the insolvent but of the receiver. On its face
Section 3466 does not apply to such claims. Hence, Section 3466 is
73. The rights of the United States are determined as of the time of the act of
insolvency. United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U. S. 353 (1923).
74. United States v. McGuire, 42 F. Supp. 337 (D. C. D. N. J. 1941).
75. The doctrine of relation back cannot classify a private creditor as a judgment
creditor before notice of the tax lien was filed for purposes of invalidating the federal
lien. MacKenzie v. United States, 1O9 F. 2d 540 (C. C. A. 9th 194o).
76. 11S F. 2d 963 (C. C. A. 4 th 1941).
77. 352 Pa. 238, 42 A. 2d 6o6 (1945).
CORRELATION OF PRIORITY AND LIEN RIGHTS
generally considered to come behind administration expenses, 78 whether
it is used against a living insolvent or is called into play because of the
death of the debtor. 79 Section 315 (a) is expressly made subject to
administration expenses.
The question naturally arises as to what are administration ex-
penses for purposes of Section 3466 and Section 315 (a). A state may
impose a property tax on property in the hands of the administrator or
the receiver. For purposes of Section 315 (a) such a tax has been held
to be an administration expense which not only reduces the estate tax
itself, but also takes priority over the lien.8 0 Taxes are also considered
administration expenses under Section 3466; 81 they are not debts due
from the insolvent. Does this mean that a subsequent exercise of the
state taxing power can, under certain circumstances, displace the federal
priority or estate tax lien? In County of Spokane v. United States 
8 2
the priority of Section 3466 was upheld against state and municipal
taxes imposed on the property in the hands of the receiver. But the
Government admitted that if the taxes were considered administration
expenses it would hesitate to say that the Section 3466 lien should be
paid first. 8 In Michigan v. United States state and municipal ad
valorem taxes were imposed on the property for taxable years after the
death of the decedent. No contention was made that they were admin-
istration expenses; apparently the estate was no longer in the process of
administration at the time the taxes were levied, although the estate
tax had not been paid. Hence, the priority of Section 315 (a) was
upheld.
It is difficult to reconcile the treatment of current taxes as admin-
istration expenses for purposes of taking priority over Section 3466
and Section 315 (a) with the inability of the states to displace the
priority or lien rights of the United States by a subsequent exercise
of their taxing power. Although the fund or property to which Sec-
tion 3466 attaches should rightfully bear the expenses necessary to
preserve it, actually the United States can not be taxed by the states.
The ad valorem tax in no way benefits the property. If administra-
tion expenses are to be satisfied before Section 3466 the type of ex-
78. Kennebec Box Co. v. Richards Corp., 5 F. 2d 951 (C. C. A. 2d 1925) ; In re
Wyley, 292 Fed. 90o (N. D. Ga. 1923).
79. Certain charges also are entitled to priority in payment over § 3466. See
United States v. Weisburn, 48 F. Supp. 393 (E. D. Pa. 1943) ; Harrison v. Deutsch,
294 Ill. App. 8, 13 N. E. 2d 511 (1938).
So. Brown v. Commissioner, 74 F. 2d 281 (C. C. A. ioth 1934) ; United States v.
Security-First Nat Bank, 3o F. Supp. 113 (S. D. Calif. 1939) ; but see Hill v. Gris-
som, 299 Fed. 641 (E. D. N. C. 1924).
SI. United States v. Eggleston, 25 Fed. Cas. 979, No. 15,o27 (C. C. D. Ore. 1877).
See also Central Vermont Ry. Co. v. Marsch, 59 F. 2d 59 (C. C. A. Ist 1932).
82. 279 U. S. 8o (1929).
83. Brief for the United States, pp. 26-27, County of Spokane v. United States.
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pense falling into that category must be rigidly defined. It may be
that for this purpose administration expenses should be restricted either
to expenses which actually benefit or increase the fund,84 or to the type
of expense which the United States would have to bear were it ad-
ministering the fund itself. Much the same argument seems applicable
to Section 315 (a). Estates may be in the process of administration
for a long period of time. The Government has not always been suc-
cessful in contending that the assets of the estate should have been
distributed to ihe legatees for purposes of the revenue laws, and the
estate considered no longer in administration.85 If all state and munic-
ipal taxes imposed during this period are administration expenses,
neither Section 315 (a) nor Section 3466 will be worth very much.86
With respect to Section 3186 the situation is somewhat reversed.
Ordinarily a lien holder does not have to pay expenses of administra-
tion except in so far as they actually benefit the property87  This would
be true for Section 315 (a) were it not for the express provision subor-
dinating the lien to expenses of administration. The imposition of
taxes under state law after Section 3186 has attached benefits the
property in no way, and is merely a subsequent exercise of the state's
taxing power which can not displace the lien of the United States. Con-
sideration of this basic fact will all but eliminate the problem of admin-
istration expenses in Section 3466 situations. -For the rights of the
United States as a lien claimant are not lost just because the United
States can invoke Section 3466. Section 3466 applies where the debtor
is insolvent and specific acts have been committed. Although one of
the enumerated acts of insolvency has been committed, the United
States can still assess the tax, make demand and claim a lien there-
*after. For example, the specified act under Section 3466 may be the
creation of an equity receivership. But the creation of such receiver-
ship under state law can not affect the right of the United States to
acquire its lien, for a state can not say that at a certain point of time
the lien of the United States can not attach. This would be tantamount
to saying that certain property is exempt from the Federal lien.
88
Hence, in Section 3466 cases if the United States makes use of its
lien rights there should be little controversy with respect to such ad-
84. See Filipowicz v. Rothensies, 43 F. Supp. 61g (E. D. Pa. 1942) (attorney's
fees for creating fund).
85. Frederich v. Commissioner, 145 F. 2d 796 (C. C. A. 5th 1944).
86. Subsequently imposed municipal taxes were held inferior to Section 315(a) in
Bowes v. United States, 127 N. J. E. 132, I A. 2d 72o (1940).
87. Byrer v. Bushong, io8 F. 2d 594 (C. C. A. 4th 194o); Miners Savings Bank
of Pittston, Pa. v. Joyce, 97 F. 2d 973 (C. C. A. 3d 1938). A possible explanation for
The River Queen, 8 F. 2d 426 (E. D. Va. 1925), in which a subsequent mortgage was
held to be superior to the federal tax lien, may lie in the fact that the mortgage was
given for the furnishing of supplies and materials which preserved the property itself.
88. See cases cited note 26 supra.
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ministration expenses as subsequently imposed state taxes. Except
insofar as the subsequently imposed state taxes are a condition to the
acquisition of additional property to which the lien of Section 3186
would attach e. g. a franchise or income tax on subsequently acquired
income, the state taxes are powerless to displace the priority of Section
3186 and eat into the property originally subject to the lien. A cor-
relation of lien and priority rights thus will defeat subsequent as well as
prior claims. 89
Bankruptcy presents about the same opportunity for the United
States to avail itself of the use of Section 3186. State and municipal
taxes imposed after bankruptcy come in as administration expenses of
the trustee in bankruptcy.90 But the Section 3186 lien for taxes owed
by the bankrupt himself would be subordinate only to that part of the
trustee's taxes which specifically benefits the lien. This is so since the
rule is well established in bankruptcy that lien holders pay no part
of the costs of administration except those from which they secure
benefit.9 Of course, wtih respect to the personal property of the bank-
rupt, the lien is expressly subordinated by Section 67 (c) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act to the ordinary expenses of administration and wage claim
priorities of Section 64 of the Act. This would not be true if the
lien were used in a Section 3466 case.
Section 3186 can not properly arise after bankruptcy as it can
after the insolvency acts of Section 3466 are committed. Section
67 (b) of the Bankruptcy Act speaks of perfecting the Federal lien for
taxes after bankruptcy if it has arisen before. This means that if the
assessment list is received prior to bankruptcy the demand can take
place thereafter to perfect a lien. But for taxes owed by the bankrupt
prior to the filing of the petition for which the assessinent list is not
received until after bankruptcy, no lien can be acquired and the United
States takes as an unsecured creditor under Section 64 (a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. Federal taxes imposed after bankruptcy are treated as
administration expenses. 92  Apparently no priority rights exist among
the various administration expenses.9 3
An interesting aspect of the problem arises in attempting to accom-
modate the conflicting rights of the United States as a priority or lien
89. However, in In re Holmes Mfg. Co., 19 F. 2d 239 (D. Conn. 1927), the court
held that administration expenses were entitled to priority in payment over both Sec-
tion 3466 and Section 3186.
go. In re Lambertville Rubber Co., iii F. 2d 45 (C. C. A. 2d 1940) ; In re Hume-
ston, 83 F. 2d 187 (C. C. A. 2d 1936). See Wurzel, Taxation During Bankruptcy
Liquidation, 55 HARv. L. REv. 14i (1942).
9i. In re Kings County Real Estate Corp., 67 F. 2d 895 (C. C. A. 2d 1933) ; Miners
Savings Bank of Pittston, Pa. v. Joyce, 97 F. 2d 973 (C. C. A. 3d 1938).
92. United States v. Killoren, ii9 F. 2d 364 (C. C. A. 8th 194) ; Security-First
Nat. Bank of Los Angeles v. United States, 153 F. 2d 563 (C. C. A. 9th 1946).
93. In re Lambertville Rubber Co., ii F. 2d 45 (C. C. A. 2d i94o).
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claimant,, the state as a tax claimant, and a prior mortgagee as a pri-
vate creditor-the so-called circuity problem.9 4 At one time it was
reasoned that since a prior mortgage was preferred to Section 3466,
any claim entitled to payment before the mortgage was also entitled to
payment ahead of Section 3466.95 In accordance with this reasoning if,
under state law, state taxes displaced a prior mortgage which was
superior to the rights of the United States under Section 3466, the state
taxes would be entitled to payment before the United States, even
though the taxes may have been imposed after the rights of the United
States attached and without the aid of the mortgage would have fallen
before Section 3466. On the other hand, the position of the Govern-
ment was that Section 3466 was to be subordinated only to the mort-
gage. This could be done by setting apart the amount necessary to pay
the mortgagee before paying Federal taxes and then satisfying the state
tax out of the fund so set apart.96
The priorities puzzle was eventually presented to the Supreme
Court in United States v. Texas 9 7 and apparently settled to the satis-
faction of the Federal Government. There a receiver was appointed
for a gasoline distributor at the suit of a chattel mortgagee. Texas
and the United States intervened with claims for state and Federal
gasoline taxes. The Texas District Court held that the mortgage
was to be satisfied first, then the United States under Section 3466
and finally the claims of Texas. But pursuant to a ruling of the Texas
Supreme Court which held that the Texas statute gave its lien first rank
over prior mortgages and the United States claim, the order of distri-
bution was entered to be Texas, the mortgagee, then the United
States.9 Certiorari was granted on the petition of the United States,
which did not seek to disturb the superior rights of the mortgage.
The only question before the United States Supreme Court was the
relative priority of the claims of the United States and Texas. The
court held that the United States was entitled to priority over Texas.
And it did so both in light of the binding construction of the Texas
Supreme Court of its local statute that the state lien was to be preferred
94. Aside from the question of the supremacy of the federal lien and priority rights,
the courts have been struggling over the "circuity, of liens" and "priorities puzzle" for
more than 2y2 centuries. Benson, Circuity of Lien-a Problem in Priorities, 1g MiNN.
L. Ray. 139 (1935) ; Note, 38 CoL. L. RBv. 1267 (1938). The Fifth Circuit's treatment
of the problem where city taxes were involved in City of New Orleans v. Harrell, 134
F. 2d 399 (C. C. A. 5th 1943), is criticized in 4 CoLLm 0Eox BANKRUPTCY 13 (Supp.
I944).
95. Ferris v. Chic-Mint Gum Co., 14 Del. Ch. 232, 124 Atl. 577 (1924) ; see also
Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University v. Hart, 26 So. 2d 361 (La. 1946).
96. County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U. S. 8o (1929).
97. 314 U. S. 480 (1941).
98. State v. Nix, 134 Tex. 476, 133 S. W. 2d 963 (1939).
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over the mortgage, and on the assumption that the mortgage was enti-
tled to priority over the United States.
The Government did not assert in United States v. Texas that
because Section 3466 was preferred to the state taxes which in turn
were superior to the mortgage, Section 3466 was entitled to be paid
first. This is a possible result and one not foreclosed by United States
v. Texas.99 It could also serve as an indirect attack upon the pre-
ferred position now accorded to mortgages over the priority demanded
by Section 3466.
The rule of United States v. Texas should apply also to the federal
lien of Section 3186. If property is mortgaged before the lien of the
United States attaches and in later years state taxes are imposed which,
under state law, are entitled to be paid before the mortgage, but which
under Michigan v. United States and United States v. City of Greenville
are to be paid after the United States, the state taxes should not be
allowed to hide behind the protection of the mortgage. 00 And this is so
even though the state taxes are paid as part of the mortgage debt. In
many cases the mortgagee pays the taxes to preserve his security, and on
foreclosure is reimbursed for such expenditures before subsequent liens
are paid. If such taxes when paid by the mortgagee become part of the
mortgage debt to take priority over Section 3186, this is merely an in-
direct way to allow subsequently imposed state taxes to displace the lien
of the United States. The authorities which have allowed such pro-
cedure must be re-examined in the light of the more recent developments
in the field. 101
INCHOATE UNPERFECTED LIENs
A recent source of controversy involves various types of liens im-
posed under state law which attach before the United States aqquires
any rights under Section 3466 or Section 386, but which require
99. This was the.exact solution of the state court when United States v. Texas
was sent back to it on remand, for it said, State v. Nix, 21 S. W. 2d 214, s (Tex.
Civ. App. 1942):
"It has thus been determined by the State Supreme Court that Dailey's (the
mortgagee) * * * claim is inferior to that of the State of Texas, and the U. S.
Supreme Court has held that the State's claim is inferior to that of the Federal
Government. The funds in the treasury of the trial court are insufficient to satisfy
the judgment in favor of the Federal Government and no necessity arises for ap-
portioning any deficit after payment of the judgment due the Federal Govern-
ment. * * *
"* * * That part of the judgment giving priority to the State of Texas over
the judgment in favor of the Federal Government will be reformed and priority will
be given to the latter over the former. * * *
"In this appeal, both Howard Dailey and the State have lost as against the Fed-
eral Government; the State has prevailed over Dailey. * * *"
oo. Hopkins v. Eureka Coal Co., P-H Fi. TAx SEv. 162,496 (C. C. Kanawha
Co., W. Va. v944).
ioi. Sherwood v. United States, 5 F. 2d 991 (E. D. N. Y. 1925).
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further steps for perfection after the rights of the United States arise-
the inchoate, floating, or unperfected type of lien. For Section 3466
these are no problem. If the state lien does not divest the insolvent of
title or possession of the property, Section 3466 will overreach the ear-
lier attachment and take priority.102 Even if certain non-possessory
perfected liens can supersede the priority demanded by Section 3466, the
Supreme Court has yet to allow a state lien to be classified as duly per-
fected and specific for this purpose. In all cases the lien has been merely
a caveat of a more perfect lien to come, either because it was uncertain
as to the amount, identity of the lienor, or property subject thereto.
However, section 3466 is not always applicable and United States
priority often depends on the attributes of the liens created by Section
3186 and Section 315 (a). We have already seen that a state can not
displace the priority of the Federal lien by a subsequent exercise of its
taxing, legislative, or judicial power and accord its own later liens
priority in payment over the earlier United States lien.' 03 Thus, al-
though the state liens are made "first liens" in all cases whatsoever,
they still must rank behind Section 3186 and Section 315 (a) if they
attach after the Federal liens have arisen. Suppose, however, that
instead of providing that the state lien shall be a "first" lien, a state
statute in imposing an ad valorem property tax, provides that the lien
shall attach on the first day of the taxable year, at which time the United
States has no lien for Federal taxes; but that the amount of the tax is
not determined and the tax assessed until after Section 3186 attaches
and notice is properly filed. If the United States were claiming under
Section 3466, the United States plainly would win, since the state lien
was inchoate as to amount at the time the rights of the United States
arose. Is there any difference if the United States is claiming as a lien
claimant under Section 3186 rather than as a non-lien priority creditor
under Section 3466? 104
The case set forth above is United States v. Reese."°  The court,
more by reliance on than by analogy to Section 3466, held that the state
of Illinois could not displace the priority of the Federal lien under
Section 3186 by relating the state lien back to the date of attachment
prescribed by the state statute. Much the same problem was involved
in United States v. Sampsell.10 6 The state of California admittedly had
inchoate floating liens uncertain as to amount at the time the United
102. See cases cited notes 6 to 12 mtpra.
1O3. Michigan v. United States, 317 U. S. 338 (1943) and United States v. City
of Greenville, ii8 F. 2d 963 (C. C. A. 4th 1Q41).
104. In Gerson, Beesley & Hampton v. Shubert Theatre Corp., 7 F. Supp. 399 (S.
D. N. Y. 1934), the court held that inchoate state liens for taxes were inferior to Sec-
tion 3466, but superior to Section 3186.
105. 131 F. 2d 466 (C. C. A. 7th 1942).
io6. 153 F. 2d 731 (C. C. A. 9th 1946).
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States liens arose. Thereafter the amount of the California taxes was
determined and by state law the liens were related back to a tax day
prior to the time Section 3186 attached. In the meantime the taxpayer
was adjudicated a bankrupt. The court held in favor of state priority.
It refused to follow United States v. Reese, claiming that there the court
had failed to consider the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Act
and had based its decision on statutes (Section 3466) not applicable to
bankruptcy proceedings. 107 It then proceeded to consider the "appli-
cable" provisions and concluded that the Bankruptcy Act sets up its
own system of priorities for lien claimants. What the court seems to
have overlooked, however, is that under that system, the priority of
competing liens when once recognized as valid for purposes of bank-
ruptcy is determined by applicable state or federal law and not by any-
thing contained in the Bankruptcy Act itself.'08 Hence, if Section 3186
is ahead of prior inchoate liens in an ordinary contest outside of bank-
ruptcy, it is also ahead of them in bankruptcy.
10 9
Examining the problem afresh we see that the analogy of the
priority of the federal lien to the priority demanded by Section 3466
is a very real one and one which was expressly recognized by the
Supreme Court in Michiga v. United States. This case did not involve
an inchoate state lien subsequently perfected but a subsequently imposed
state lien. Yet the Supreme Court clearly pointed out that the problem
of the subsequently imposed state lien involved the same considerations
as the Section 3466 inchoate lien cases. In both instances a subsequent
exercise of state power seeks to displace federal rights which have al-
ready attached. If it is an interference with the federal lien for a state
to call its subsequently imposed state liens a first lien in all cases whatso-
ever, it is just as much an interference for the state to say that its lien
arises on a day prior to the time the state tax is assessed and determined.
1O7. United States v. Reese was not a bankruptcy case. It involved a suit by the
United States under Section 3207 to enforce a lien against property which had belonged
to the taxpayer at the time the federal lien arose, but which thereafter had been seized
in execution and sold by a judgment creditor. At the time of the suit the taxpayer was
a bankrupt, and his only connection with the case was that he had been the former
owner of the property subject to the lien. However, the Government's brief in United
States v. Sampsell refers to United States v. Reese as involving a dispute between two
lien claimants in bankruptcy. Brief for the United States, p. 2o.
ioS. Seymour v. Wildgen, 137 F. 2d I6o (C. C. A. ioth 1943); Lerner Stores
Corp. v. Electric Maid Bake Shops, 24 F. 2d 780 (C. C. A. 5th 1928). Although state
law determines the validity of the state lien, City of New York v. Hall, 139 F. 2d 935
(C. C. A. 2d 1944), it is a matter of federal law whether the state lien seeks to displace
lien or priority rights of the United States which have previously attached. Michigan
v. United States, 317 U. S. 338 (1943) ; United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn,
Inc., 323 U. S. 353 (1945).
109. The reference by the court in United States v. Reese to the "liens" created by
Section 3466 is particularly unfortunate and casts some doubt as to whether the court
actually realized that the priority demanded by Section 3466 over inchoate liens was
applicable to Section 3186 only by analogy. COLLIER, op. cit. mtpra note 94, seems to
think the case correctly decided and the analogy good.
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This can be readily demonstrated if we assume the case. of a state statute
providing that the state tax shall be a lien and attach to the property at
the time the statute is passed. Each year the state determines and
assesses the tax which, until paid, is a lien on the property from the date
of the taxing statute. The lien of the United States may arise years
prior to the year for which the state tax remains unpaid. Yet by the
mere ipse dixit in the state statute creating a lien date, the lien of the
United States is lost even though everything necessary to be done to
establish the state lien takes place after Section 3186 has arisen.110 The
priority of Section 3186 would thus be dependent upon the choice of
words of the state statute. If the state statute creates a first lien without
specifying a lien date, Section 3186 wins; but if the state statute dates
the lien to a time when the statute was passed or property acquired, the
state wins.
Section 3186 is to be interpreted as are other parts of the Internal
Revenue Code in accordance with a nationwide scheme of taxation.
111
Its priority is not to be subject to technical differences in language used
by state legislatures in setting up their own tax liens. The perfection of
an inchoate state lien to the detriment of the United States must be put
in the same category as the imposition of a totally new state lien.
So far we have proceeded upon the theory that to give priority to
an inchoate state lien perfected after the federal lien for taxes has arisen
is an interference with the federal power to lay and collect taxes. More-
over, is not such action also an attempt to tax property of the United
States? In United States v. City of Greenville Judge Parker advanced
as an alternative ground for denying priority to the subsequently im-
posed state tax lien the thought that when the federal lien attached the
property had two owners, the taxpayer and the United States to the
extent of the lien. This being so the subsequent tax by the state was in
effect a tax on the Federal Government. The same reasoning would
seem to apply to the inchoate lien cases if United States v. Alabama 11
does not stand in the way.
In United States v. Alabama, the state statute provided that the
lien for taxes was to arise on October i, although the tax rate was to be
determined and the taxes assessed thereafter. On October i, United
States purchased property in Alabama. Where one sovereign purchases
the property of another something usually happens to the liens of the
IIo. It may be said that Section 386 arises in the same way and that a judgment
may attach between the time the assessment list is received by the collector and demand
is made on the taxpayer. The demand would be a subsequent exercise of the power to
tax by the Federal Government, for without demand there is no lien. But the Federal
Government can provide that its lien shall have retroactive effect as against state liens.
ii. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103 (1932) ; United States v. Snyder, 149 U. S.
210 (i893).
112. 313 U. S. 274 (1941).
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first. Although in some instances the liens may still be enforceable
against the new sovereign owner, in other instances they may be
destroyed and the land sold free and clear of the liens, or the liens may
lie dormant and be revived on a subsequent sale of the property to a
private person. 113 After the United States acquired the land Alabama
determined the tax rate, assessed the tax against the former owner, and
claimed that its liens were good against the United States, asserting that
when it assessed the tax, the liens related back to October i, the day
the United States purchased the property. On an original bill to quiet
title, under which the United States argued that Alabama was attempt-
ing to tax the property of the United States, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that although the lien of Alabama was inchoate at the time the
United States acquired the land nothing prohibited the lien from being
perfected while the United States owned the land, and this did not
amount to a tax on property of the Federal Government. The state
liens were, therefore, held to be valid although unenforceable so long as
title to the property remained in the United States.
It is difficult to reconcile the holding of United States v. Alabama
with the well settled principle that a state can not directly tax the prop-
erty of the United States.' 14 In theory at least a state could continue
to determine and assess taxes for years while property was held by the
United States by the simple device of relating the lien for the taxes to
some lien date prior to the time the property was acquired by the United
States." 5  Though the lien could not be enforced against the United
States directly, when the United States sold the property the purchaser,
knowing that he would take subject to the state lien, would of necessity
pay a price reduced by the state lien. It surely would seem that if the
United States as an actual purchaser lays itself open to such indirect
taxation by state use of inchoate floating tax liens, the United States as
a lien creditor or Section 3466 priority claimant should be in no better
position. But it is equally well settled that inchoate state liens can not
override the priority of Section 3466. In fact in arriving at the con-
clusion that the tax lien of Alabama was good the court quite deliber-
ately gave approval to the holding in United States v. Maclay ll which
refused to allow an inchoate lien to override the priority demanded by
Section 3466 by any doctrine of relation back.
Although Section 3466 priority is not adversely affected by United
States v. Alabama, is the same true for Section 3186? This is the
problem which confronted the court in United States v. Reese. Realiz-
113. See Note- I58 A. L. R. 563 (i945).
114. Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, 179-180 (1886).
115. This seems to be the concern of the writer of the case note in 40 MIcH. L.
RE~v. 29o (1941).
I16. 288 U. S. 290 (1933).
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ing that to cast the United States in the role of a purchaser to the extent
of the lien would run afoul of United States v. Alabama, yet realizing
that the Section 3466 cases were still good law, the court charted its
course between the two conflicting doctrines and came out with what, in
view of Michigan v. United States, must be the proper result. In
United States v. Alabama, Congress was silent as to the effect of the
inchoate state lien. But Section 3186 is an affirmative exercise of the
Federal power to lay and collect taxes. Congress has created a lien for
taxes, and the lien can not be adversely affected by what a state does
once the lien arises. If a state fails to determine and assess its state
taxes no state lien will actually arise despite the existence of the inchoate
state lien. Hence, the subsequent action of perfecting the inchoate state
lien is an attempt, not to tax the property of the United States, but to
displace the tax lien of the United States. The United States as a lien
claimant or Section 3466 priority creditor thus stands in a better posi-
tion with regard to inchoate state liens than it does as a purchaser.
Michigan v. United States makes no mention of the earlier decision in
United States v. Alabama. Although the state lien involved in Mich-
igan v. United States was a "first" lien which did not arise on any
particular lien day, the analogy drawn by the court to the Section 3466
cases reveals that the perfection of an inchoate state lien is a subsequent
exercise of state power which can not displace a lien of the United
States imposed under the constitutional authority to lay and collect
taxes. United States v. Alabama seems wrong and there is no need to
extend its holding beyond its exact facts.
To hold that inchoate liens can not relate back and supplant the
lien of the United States will not conflict with any policy- expressed in
the recording provisions of Section 3186. The recording provisions
were designed to protect creditors who rely on the state of the record.
But it is not enough for the creditor merely to lend .money before the
United States has recorded. The creditor must record before United
States gives notice. 117 Hence, just as a judgment or mortgage creditor
who lends money to the debtor before Section 3186 arises but fails to
record until after notice of Section 3186 has been filed will lose his
priority, so too a creditor's inchoate lien can be displaced by the United
States any time prior to its perfection without violating the policy of the
recording provisions.
A variation of a problem previously touched upon can now be
examined. One of the characteristics which makes a lien inchoate is
that the amount of the lien is uncertain. Suppose goods are seized in a
suit started by attachment, say for $75,ooo, but judgment is rendered
117. Mackenzie v. United States, iog F. 2d 540 (C. C. A. 9th, 194o).
CORRELATION OF PRIORITY AND LIEN RIGHTS
for only $25,000. After attachment but before final judgment, the
United States acquires and files notice of its lien under Section 3186.118
If the United States were claiming under Section 3466, the United
States would take priority, either because the suit by attachment created
no perfected lien,119 or because the amount of the lien was not liquidated
and certain. The lien of attachment should likewise fall before Section
3186 since the aid of the court is necessary to fix the amount of the
judgment for which the lien of attachment is security by relation
back.12 0  It is true in this type of case the subsequent exercise by the
state court is not under the taxing power, but the important feature is
not under what color or claim of right the state court acts but rather
the effect of its action on the federal power to collect taxes.
In the above situation the amount of the original atachment or lien
was greater than the amount of the final judgment. Suppose, however,
a liquidated and definite amount is first claimed, but after the Federal
lien has attached, additional sums are added. This was true in United
States v. Sampsell 121 where attorney's fees and interest went into the
principal sum of the mortgage ahead of Section 3186, and in First Na-
tional Bank of Alexr, Oklahoma v. Southland Production Co.12 2 where
state taxes secured by a so-called specific perfected prior lien were sub-
sequently discovered to be understated to the detriment of the claim of
the United States. With regard to the latter case, although there would
be no reason for allowing subsequent accruing taxes to be related back
to an earlier lien date, the mere error in computing the amount of the
state lien should not affect its priority.
The problem of attorney's fees and interest is somewhat different.
Interest has a sort of special place in creditors' rights. 2 3 Technically
the problem is to what extent the United States has consented to give
the mortgage priority. Probably to the extent of the principal sum plus
interest plus those attorney's fees necessary to protect the mortgage
against unsubstantiated claims of the United States to displace it. Since
the United States if it foreclosed would have to pay the expenses of fore-
closure and give the principal sum to the mortgagee, it seems only right
to allow such expenses to take precedence when paid for by the mort-
gagee. This is somewhat similar to the collector selling goods and
paying the costs of the sale before collecting the tax.
2 4
11S. As in Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University v. Hart, 26 So. 2d
361 (La. 1946). The Lousiana court held in favor of the private creditor.
11g. Willing v. Bleeker, 2 S. & R. 221 (D. C. Phila., Pa. 1816).
i2O. Cf. United States v. Texas, 314 U. S. 480 (941).
121. 153 F. 2d 731 (C. C. A. 9th 1946) ; see also Ormsbee v. United States, 23 F.
2d 926 (S. D. Fla. 1928).
122. 189 Okla. 9, 112 P. 2d 1087 (1941).
123. See Ticonic Bank v. Sprague, 303 U. S. 4o6 (1938) ; Louisville Bank v. Brad-
ford, 295 U. S. 555, 557 (.1935).
124. See INT. REv. CODE § 3694; In re Wyley, 292 Fed. 9oo (N. D. Ga. 1923).
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CONCLUSION
The Government has been most zealous in protecting the revenue
where state action has attempted to encroach upon the priority de-
manded by Section 3466.125 However, it has refused to push its de-
mands for a final adjudication in lien cases 126 which have in many
instances greater importance and wider application. For the lien
affords the Government its only real protection in bankruptcy. It com-
plements the use of Section 3466 to override the priority of earlier as
well as subsequent claims. Further where the taxpayer is solvent, or
being insolvent, has committed no act specified in Section 3466, that
section does not apply; and unless the priority of the federal lien is
definitely established, the assests of the taxpayer will be taken over by
competing creditors with the United States standing by with an empty
Section 3466 on the one hand and a'subordinate tax lien on the other.
125. See cases cited note 8 supra; also the recent case of United States v. Remund,
15 U. S. L. WE.K 4355 (March 17, 1947).
126. The Solicitor General refused to authorize certiorari in United States v.
Sampsell, 5 P-H FED. TAx SERv. 71,077 (1946) and Board of Supervisors of the
Louisiana State University v. Hart, 5 P-H FED. TAx SERv. f[ 71,111 (1946).
